Social Networking

Facebook, MySpace, LinkedIn, GovLoop..... which one? All of them? None of them?
How did we ever make friends growing up? Do you ever wonder?

In the playground of digits and keyboards, social interaction has become an avatar and screen time. Not face-to-face interaction but acronyms and shortened phrases that our parents won't recognize. Conversations are short and to the point and meeting people has become an electronic game of who knows who.

I can remember when my sorority sister met her fiance through an online dating service and all of us were appalled. Being from the south, it was unheard of. Simply not done. To put yourself out there without the protection of your sisters. Entirely too independent. The safety net of the flock nowhere to be found.

Now it seems the way to find a job, a colleague, information for your work project is to post it out on Twitter or Facebook or LinkenIn and see who can help you. It's fast and efficient and who knows what matter of expert is out there to assist you.
The way we work has changed and the way we make friends has changed.

And I like it. There are people all over the world and social networking has opened up avenues so far beyond the backyard playground that our experiences can expand so far past what we once knew. Exposing ourselves to other cultures and ideas that the possibilities are limitless.

So I say pick Facebook to reconnect with your hometown buddies, LinkedIn for your professional life, Twitter to stay on top of things, GovLoop if your a DC careerist and use Google or Yahoo if none of these work for you. Cynic? Privacy feign? Look into them. They have the settings and you determine what you want to put out there.

This is just the tip of the iceberg folks. Those silicon valley basement geniuses will come up with something even better next.

'Get the Terrorist' Program for All

Flight 253 from the Netherlands to Detroit - One 23-year old Nigerian is taken out by passengers Alain Ghonda and Jasper Schuringa. That tells me that maybe what we need is to take the 3 oz bottles out of the little plastic baggies. Keep our shoes on and leave laptops in the bags. I'm pretty sure the marmalade I brought back from Barbados wasn't loaded.
But instead how about training all passengers on self-defense?

Let's forget forboding, irritating security at all airports worldwide that is obtrusive, annoying and evidently not working. Forget massive amounts of troops overseas for years on end that seem to result in Al-Quaida moving training camps to more fertile breeding grounds (read Yemen.)

Let's put our effort toward training every day Americans on thwarting threats. Rather than relying on ill-trained TSA guards or putting our faith in drones flown out of Nevada, how about we each take a little piece of responsibility in our own protection?

So here's my idea: a two-day "Get the Terrorist" program. Teach regular Americans how to identify suspicious activity, radicalism, fundamentalism and how to report it. Volunteers of course. This should also teach the difference between a regular Joe and fanatic. Obviously this isn't easy. But if you notice someone who checks no bags, pays with cash, wears a skull cap and shouts "Allahu AkBar" as he boards your plane, I might reconsider my trip to Aunt Bessie's and call my local FBI agent.

Of course, if all of this gets missed and you end up on the plane or bus or train or some very crowded public place that could cause mass casualties with a person like this, then the program should teach you how to take this person out. Just like Alain Ghonda and Jasper Schuringa had the nerve to do. Just like the Flight 93 passengers had the nerve to do. When it comes to terrorism on American soil, our military is not going to be there to do anything about it.

We, the American people, are going to be there. We need to be able to do something about it. And we need to be able to recognize the difference between a bottle of water and the PETN that this kid exploded in his pants - or at least be able to put it out, take him down and land the plane safely.

(Time Magazine article in the link above on What We Can Learn from Flight 253)

The Blind Side - An SEC girl loved it!

For a Bama girl, The Blind Side is a must-see movie! Even if you’re aren’t a hotty-toddy from Ole Miss, this is a Southeastern Conference football lovers must see. And the cameos by Nick Saban, Phil Fulmer, Lou Holtz, Tommy Tuberville and Houston Nutt are just the tip of the iceberg.

Leigh Anne Tuohy is the loud mouthed, tell-it-like-it-is typical NRA-card carrying girl from Mississippi and Sandy Bullock plays the role to perfection. My favorite scene is when the family goes to one of 'Big Mike's' first games and he is heckled repeatedly by one of the rednecks in the stands; Leigh Anne stands up and says, "Hey! Deliverance. That is my son and if you don't knock it off, I'm gonna come up there and make you." or something like that. But she is brash and so bold as to walk in the ghetto and tell off drug dealers who you know are packing that you just have to love her. She absolutely steals the show.

It will have you hate the NCAA just as the Bear did when he said if one of his boys needs shoes, he'll give 'em shoes and damn the NCAA. And it will have you cry in the end when Mike goes to the Baltimore Ravens in the 23rd round of the 2009 NFL draft.

I hate the line a 2 thumbs up but it sure was for me. Tim McGraw is a hoot as Leigh Anne's college sweetheart husband who apparently hit it big buying up franchises in Memphis. And Kathy Bates scores as Mike's tutor from Ole Miss who tells ghost stories about Tennessee...just in case he thought about playing ball at that god forsaken place. A definite touchdown and two point conversion!

Hijacking Christmas

So I read another magazine article about hijacking Christmas and apparently this is not a 21st century phenom. It's been going on for quite some time. In the 20s, the Jews were blamed. In the 40s, it was the Commies. In the 60s, it was the ACLU liberal bastards. Now it's the PC socialists.

I was at a commander's call when the lieutenant who was "voluntold" to run the "Holiday" Party got up to give us all the schpiel on what to expect. He told us it was the "Pick your Holiday" party. That about sums it up.

Kwanza - don't know what that is.
Hannukah - a holiday that my Jewish friend forgot was going on two years ago when we had to work on Christmas day.
Yule - my Wiccan friend celebrates while surfing out in San Diego.
And Christmas - still celebrated with a Nativity scene on the courthouse steps in my hometown.

Hijacked or not. I'll continue to go to Midnight Mass and send out Christmas cards and say Merry Christmas and put up my Christmas tree and have Christmas Parties. I've decided that it's worked for 2000 years and people don't seem to be offended when I give them a Christmas gift. If they are, then that sort of defeats the purpose of the season regardless of what you call it.

So, sit on your PC crap and Merry Christmas!

"We're in a communist country"

It's interesting to me who you meet in line.

This lady in line at Office Depot today let me know that we are in a communist country because all creativity and individualism is lost. Her beef started because she had to spend $6 on a red, 3-subject notebook with pockets.

This was tax-free weekend. The state has designated the weekend before school starts the time to buy supplies without paying taxes. Nice idea. And we certainly took advantage of it. So did most of the state's 3 million other residents.

But the woman did have a small point. As soon as you walk into all the stores, there are stands with lists from all the area schools. The lists detail what supplies are required for each school. Caiden's list requires her to have about 25 items, including a red 3-pronged pocket folder and a green one. Not yellow. Not blue. Not with cute, little kittens. One red. One green.

We have also spent the last two days scouring for clear, plastic rulers, Fiskar scissors, 2" white plastic binders with clear overlays, washable markers, one black pen and one blue pen, a zipper pencil bag with 3 holes. So I get the woman's point.

This lady also sent her child running back into the store from the checkout line 3 times because she found items in the Sunday ad for free stuff. She told me that since she was being required by the government to buy all this stuff that she might as well get something out of it.

Her tirade against government interference in her life got me thinking about how fun it was when I was a kid to do back-to-school shopping. Cool folders, new notebooks, colorful pencils with lots of different designs. I always liked the swirly ones. Pinks and blues.

During this trip, Caiden kept picking out folders with princesses and kittens on them. But they weren't on our required items list, so I had her put them back. Well, once we finally found everything and made it to the register to pay, I noticed the Sunday ad.

A free backpack with a purchase of $40 or more. I was certainly paying $40 or more. Hmmm?
What the hell?
I sent Caiden running for a pink one.

Cuts and Scrapes

I hear "Hello!" coming from the front door today. My new neighbor is calling to me as I'm straightening up the guest room. I come around the corner and he pokes his head in the door. "Your little girl's had a spill," he says to me. This is my neighbor across the cul-de-sac who was mowing his lawn in the 100-degree heat. His own little girl was hanging out in the shade.

Looking out the front door, Caiden is at the bottom of the driveway tangled up in her purple scooter with the purple tassles, holding her head. Yep, she had a spill alright.
Now, she has been gathering up the courage to go all the way down the driveway on that scooter for two weeks. Normally she goes half way and walks the rest of the way. Guess today she had it in here to make it all the way. But oops, she crashed and burned at the bottom. Poor thing had a bump on her head and all limbs had scrapes, cuts, a little blood and dirt.

Good thing I had Scooby Doo band-aids on hand. I kept thinking about how this was a right of childhood passage. Skinned knees. Toughens her up. And of course, a trip to Cold Stone cured all!

It's Time for the US to Declare Victory and Go Home -- Text from Col. Timothy Reese Memo

This was published in NY Times, July 31, 2009

Text of memo from Col. Timothy R. Reese, Chief, Baghdad Operations Command Advisory Team, MND-B, Baghdad, Iraq.

It’s Time for the US to Declare Victory and Go Home

As the old saying goes, “guests, like fish, begin to smell after three days.” Since the signing of the 2009 Security Agreement, we are guests in Iraq, and after six years in Iraq, we now smell bad to the Iraqi nose. Today the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) are good enough to keep the Government of Iraq (GOI) from being overthrown by the actions of Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), the Baathists, and the Shia violent extremists that might have toppled it a year or two ago. Iraq may well collapse into chaos of other causes, but we have made the ISF strong enough for the internal security mission. Perhaps it is one of those infamous paradoxes of counterinsurgency that while the ISF is not good in any objective sense, it is good enough for Iraq in 2009. Despite this foreboding disclaimer about an unstable future for Iraq, the United States has achieved our objectives in Iraq. Prime Minister (PM) Maliki hailed June 30th as a “great victory,” implying the victory was over the US. Leaving aside his childish chest pounding, he was more right than he knew. We too ought to declare victory and bring our combat forces home. Due to our tendency to look after the tactical details and miss the proverbial forest for the trees, this critically important strategic realization is in danger of being missed.

Equally important to realize is that we aren’t making the GOI and the ISF better in any significant ways with our current approach. Remaining in Iraq through the end of December 2011 will yield little in the way of improving the abilities of the ISF or the functioning of the GOI. Furthermore, in light of the GOI’s current interpretation of the limitations imposed by the 30 June milestones of the 2008 Security Agreement, the security of US forces are at risk. Iraq is not a country with a history of treating even its welcomed guests well. This is not to say we can be defeated, only that the danger of a violent incident that will rupture the current partnership has greatly increased since 30 June. Such a rupture would force an unplanned early departure that would harm our long term interests in Iraq and potentially unraveling the great good that has been done since 2003. The use of the military instrument of national power in its current form has accomplished all that can be expected. In the next section I will present and admittedly one sided view of the evidence in support of this view. This information is drawn solely from the MND-B area of operations in Baghdad Province. My reading of reports from the other provinces suggests the same situation exists there.

The general lack of progress in essential services and good governance is now so broad that it ought to be clear that we no longer are moving the Iraqis “forward.” Below is an outline of the information on which I base this assessment:

1. The ineffectiveness and corruption of GOI Ministries is the stuff of legend.

2. The anti-corruption drive is little more than a campaign tool for Maliki

3. The GOI is failing to take rational steps to improve its electrical infrastructure and to improve their oil exploration, production and exports.

4. There is no progress towards resolving the Kirkuk situation.

5. Sunni Reconciliation is at best at a standstill and probably going backwards.

6. Sons of Iraq (SOI) or Sahwa transition to ISF and GOI civil service is not happening, and SOI monthly paydays continue to fall further behind.

7. The Kurdish situation continues to fester.

8. Political violence and intimidation is rampant in the civilian community as well as military and legal institutions.

9. The Vice President received a rather cool reception this past weekend and was publicly told that the internal affairs of Iraq are none of the US’s business.

The rate of improvement of the ISF is far slower than it should be given the amount of effort and resources being provided by the US. The US has made tremendous progress in building the ISF. Our initial efforts in 2003 to mid-2004 were only marginally successful. From 2004 to 2006 the US built the ISF into a fighting force. Since the start of the surge in 2007 we have again expanded and improved the ISF. They are now at the point where they have defeated the organized insurgency against the GOI and are marginally self-sustaining. This is a remarkable tale for which many can be justifiably proud. We have reached the point of diminishing returns, however, and need to find a new set of tools. The massive partnering efforts of US combat forces with ISF isn’t yielding benefits commensurate with the effort and is now generating its own opposition. Again, some touch points for this assessment are:

1. If there ever was a window where the seeds of a professional military culture could have been implanted, it is now long past. US combat forces will not be here long enough or with sufficient influence to change it.

2. The military culture of the Baathist-Soviet model under Saddam Hussein remains entrenched and will not change. The senior leadership of the ISF is incapable of change in the current environment.

a) Corruption among officers is widespread

b) Neglect and mistreatment of enlisted men is the norm

c) The unwillingness to accept a role for the NCO corps continues

d) Cronyism and nepotism are rampant in the assignment and promotion system

e) Laziness is endemic

f) Extreme centralization of C2 is the norm

g) Lack of initiative is legion

h) Unwillingness to change, do anything new blocks progress

i) Near total ineffectiveness of the Iraq Army and National Police institutional organizations and systems prevents the ISF from becoming self-sustaining

j) For every positive story about a good ISF junior officer with initiative, or an ISF commander who conducts a rehearsal or an after action review or some individual MOS training event, there are ten examples of the most basic lack of military understanding despite the massive partnership efforts by our combat forces and advisory efforts by MiTT and NPTT teams.

3. For all the fawning praise we bestow on the Baghdad Operations Command (BOC) and Ministry of Defense (MoD) leadership for their effectiveness since the start of the surge, they are flawed in serious ways. Below are some salient examples:

a) They are unable to plan ahead, unable to secure the PM’s approval for their actions

b) They are unable to stand up to Shiite political parties

c) They were and are unable to conduct an public relations effort in support of the SA and now they are afraid of the ignorant masses as a result

d) They unable to instill discipline among their officers and units for the most basic military standards

e) They are unable to stop the nepotism and cronyism

f) They are unable to take basic steps to manage the force development process

g) They are unable to stick to their deals with US leaders

It is clear that the 30 Jun milestone does not represent one small step in a long series of gradual steps on the path the US withdrawal, but as Maliki has termed it, a “great victory” over the Americans and fundamental change in our relationship. The recent impact of this mentality on military operations is evident:

1. Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC) unilateral restrictions on US forces that violate the most basic aspects of the SA

2. BOC unilateral restrictions that violate the most basic aspects of the SA

3. International Zone incidents in the last week where ISF forces have resorted to shows of force to get their way at Entry Control Points (ECP) including the forcible takeover of ECP 1 on 4 July

4. Sudden coolness to advisors and CDRs, lack of invitations to meetings,

5. Widespread partnership problems reported in other areas such as ISF confronting US forces at TCPs in the city of Baghdad and other major cities in Iraq.

6. ISF units are far less likely to want to conduct combined combat operations with US forces, to go after targets the US considers high value, etc.

7. The Iraqi legal system in the Rusafa side of Baghdad has demonstrated a recent willingness to release individuals originally detained by the US for attacks on the US.

Yet despite all their grievous shortcomings noted above, ISF military capability is sufficient to handle the current level of threats from Sunni and Shiite violent groups. Our combat forces’ presence here on the streets and in the rural areas adds only marginally to their capability while exposing us to attacks to which we cannot effectively respond.

The GOI and the ISF will not be toppled by the violence as they might have been between 2006 and 2008. Though two weeks does not make a trend, the near cessation of attacks since 30 June speaks volumes about how easily Shiite violence can be controlled and speaks to the utter weakness of AQI. The extent of AQ influence in Iraq is so limited as to be insignificant, only when they get lucky with a mass casualty attack are they relevant. Shiite groups are working with the PM and his political allies, or plotting to work against him in the upcoming elections. We are merely convenient targets for delivering a message against Maliki by certain groups, and perhaps by Maliki when he wants us to be targeted. Extremist violence from all groups is directed towards affecting their political standing within the existing power structures of Iraq. There is no longer any coherent insurgency or serious threat to the stability of the GOI posed by violent groups.

Our combat operations are currently the victim of circular logic. We conduct operations to kill or capture violent extremists of all types to protect the Iraqi people and support the GOI. The violent extremists attack us because we are still here conducting military operations. Furthermore, their attacks on us are no longer an organized campaign to defeat our will to stay; the attacks which kill and maim US combat troops are signals or messages sent by various groups as part of the political struggle for power in Iraq. The exception to this is AQI which continues is globalist terror campaign. Our operations are in support of an Iraqi government that no longer relishes our help while at the same time our operations generate the extremist opposition to us as various groups jockey for power in post-occupation Iraq.

The GOI and ISF will continue to squeeze the US for all the “goodies” that we can provide between now and December 2011, while eliminating our role in providing security and resisting our efforts to change the institutional problems prevent the ISF from getting better. They will tolerate us as long as they can suckle at Uncle Sam’s bounteous mammary glands. Meanwhile the level of resistance to US freedom of movement and operations will grow. The potential for Iraqi on US violence is high now and will grow by the day. Resentment on both sides will build and reinforce itself until a violent incident break outs into the open. If that were to happen the violence will remain tactically isolated, but it will wreck our strategic relationships and force our withdrawal under very unfavorable circumstances.

For a long time the preferred US approach has been to “work it at the lowest level of partnership” as a means to stay out of the political fray and with the hope that good work at the tactical level will compensate for and slowly improve the strategic picture. From platoon to brigade, US Soldiers and Marines continue to work incredibly hard and in almost all cases they achieve positive results. This approach has achieved impressive results in the past, but today it is failing. The strategic dysfunctions of the GOI and ISF have now reached down to the tactical level degrading good work there and sundering hitherto strong partnerships. As one astute political observer has stated “We have lost all strategic influence with the GoI and trying to influence events and people from the tactical/operational level is courting disaster, wasting lives, and merely postponing the inevitable.”

The reality of Iraq in July 2009 has rendered the assumptions underlying the 2008 Security Agreement (SA) overcome by events — mostly good events actually. The SA outlines a series of gradual steps towards military withdrawal, analogous to a father teaching his kid to ride a bike without training wheels. If the GOI at the time the SA was signed thought it needed a long, gradual period of weaning. But the GOI now has left the nest (while continuing to breast feed as noted above). The strategic and tactical realities have changed far quicker than the provisions and timeline of the SA can accommodate. We now have an Iraqi government that has gained its balance and thinks it knows how to ride the bike in the race. And in fact they probably do know how to ride, at least well enough for the road they are on against their current competitors. Our hand on the back of the seat is holding them back and causing resentment. We need to let go before we both tumble to the ground.

Therefore, we should declare our intentions to withdraw all US military forces from Iraq by August 2010. This would not be a strategic paradigm shift, but an acceleration of existing US plans by some 15 months. We should end our combat operations now, save those for our own force protection, narrowly defined, as we withdraw. We should revise the force flow into Iraq accordingly. The emphasis should shift towards advising only and advising the ISF to prepare for our withdrawal. Advisors should probably be limited to Iraqi division level a higher. Our train and equip functions should begin the transition to Foreign Military Sales and related training programs. During the withdrawal period the USG and GOI should develop a new strategic framework agreement that would include some lasting military presence at 1-3 large training bases, airbases, or key headquarters locations. But it should not include the presence of any combat forces save those for force protection needs or the occasional exercise. These changes would not only align our actions with the reality of Iraq in 2009, it will remove the causes of increasing friction and reduce the cost of OIF in blood and treasure. Finally, it will set the conditions for a new relationship between the US and Iraq without the complications of the residual effects of the US invasion and occupation.